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The  study  of the dynamics  taking  place  during  power  system  blackouts  is a subject  that  receives  contin-
uous  attention  in  view  of  its  inherent  complexity  and relevant  consequences.  Within  this context,  the
paper  aims  at  studying  the  role  of  the  frequency  control  reserves  (FCRs)  on the cascading  outages  and
the  relevant  short-term  dynamics  associated  with  the blackout  mechanisms.  The relationship  between
the  large  and  small  blackout  frequency  with  respect  to  the  value  of FCRs  is assessed.  More  in  particular,ascading outages
onte Carlo simulation
nterconnected power system
hort-term dynamics
the  main  contribution  of  this  paper  is to study  the  inﬂuence  of  the power  system  interconnections  on  its
pre-  and  post-blackout  behavior.  For  this  investigation,  a statistical  procedure,  based  on  the  Monte  Carlo
simulation  (MCS),  is proposed.  It  performs  a  blackout  risk  analysis  considering  cascading  outages  as  well
as generators/loads  response  to the  frequency  deviation.  The  proposed  procedure  is then  applied  to  the
IEEE 118  bus  system  as  an  interconnected  network  characterized  by three  areas.  The  distributions  and
ackouexpected  values  of  the  bl
. Introduction
Power transmission networks are large and complex systems
hat have experienced wide blackouts in the recent two  decades
i.e. the Northeast and Italy blackouts in 2003 and India 2012).
lthough large cascading blackouts are relatively rare events, the
nvestigation of their mechanism calls for signiﬁcant efforts in
iew of the relevant consequences. Understanding the dynamics
f power system components through their interactions with dif-
erent control methods are the main challenges to comprehend a
lackout mechanism. In this respect, several investigations have
een performed in the literatures [1–6]. An additional aspect that
ncreases the difﬁculty of the problem is the operation of single
ower systems within an interconnected continental-scale grid
e.g. interconnected networks in continental Europe – ENTSOE and
orth America – NERC). The areas of an interconnected power sys-
em generally proﬁt from (i) increased security and (ii) mutual
conomically efﬁcient generation. The higher security margins are
 consequence of shared active power reserves. However, the secu-
ity of the resulting interconnected power system could decrease
ith the increase of the interconnection and, consequently, with
he increase of the power systems operation-complexity due to
ropagation of events, inter-area oscillations, etc. Hence, the deliv-
ry of required control actions should be carefully evaluated due
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to the counter-intuitive effects of opposing driving forces in power
systems.
The analysis of the times series of blackouts size measures, e.g.
energy not served (ENS) and load not served (LNS), in North Amer-
ica, China, Sweden, Norway, New Zealand, and continental Europe
has shown a power law region in their distributions. This peculiar-
ity demonstrates that the dynamics of blackouts can be associated
to complex systems with self-organized criticality (SOC) feature
[1]. In the system with the SOC characteristic, there are different
types of variables with opposing driving forces that, in certain con-
ditions, could drive the system into a critical operation state. In
this case, after the occurrence of an initial fault or disturbance, cas-
cading outages could cause a blackout (e.g. [2]). Furthermore, the
power law region in the distributions implies that the blackouts of
different scales may  take place and the extreme events cannot be
overlooked. The system may experience large blackouts with cer-
tain probabilities and the occurrences of small/large blackouts are
not independent but correlated to each other (e.g. [3,7]).
It should be noted that the study of power systems short-term
dynamics assumes a system with a ﬁxed topology. Therefore, the
continuous evolution of the power system state and conﬁguration
under complex dynamics are, in general, neglected [8]. By mak-
ing use of the above-assumption, and within the context of risk
assessment, this paper investigates the role of frequency control
reserves (FCRs) on cascading outages and short-term dynamics of
blackouts with particular reference to interconnected systems. The
structure of the paper is the following: Section 2 provides the prob-
lem deﬁnition, Section 3 describes the blackout risk assessment
methodology, Section 4 illustrates and discusses the simulation
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esults with reference to the IEEE 118 bus test system considered
s an interconnected network with three main areas, Section 5
iscusses the possible approaches to solve the analyzed problem
nd Section 6 ﬁnally concludes the main outcomes of this study.
. Problem deﬁnition
The different aspects of the cascading dynamics could be inves-
igated in different time scales, namely, long-term, short-term, and
ransient dynamics [2]. The long-term dynamic investigates the
ole of load growth and engineering responses as external oppos-
ng forces to evaluate the system margins from critical loading
n monthly or yearly time scales. The short-term dynamic in the
ange between several minutes to an hour, represents the internal
ystem driving forces while the external forces are approximately
emaining constant. It is associated with redistribution of power
ows after the event and the response of controllers designed
eforehand. The transient dynamics from milliseconds to seconds
epresents the inductive factor initiated by transient instability
ubsequent to large disturbances. The successive transient dynam-
cs may  cause abrupt outages.
The understanding of these dynamics can help to analyze char-
cteristics of disasters and catastrophes, to evaluate the distance
etween the system’s current state and its critical state and then
o design preventive control strategies. In this respect, the blackout
ynamics of the power grid should be appropriately modeled. Var-
ous methods have been proposed to model and analyze different
spects of blackouts in long-term, short-term and transient dynam-
cs [9], such as, hidden failure model, OPA (ORNL-PSerc-Alaska)
odel, Manchester model, optimal power ﬂow (OPF) based model
nd OPF transient stability (OTS) model. Besides these research
odels, several commercial tools have been developed in the
ndustry, for instances, ASSESS, CAT, POM-PCM, TRELSS [9].
In this paper we focus speciﬁcally on the short-term dynam-
cs of blackouts concerning the FCRs. The main idea is to study the
ynamics of blackouts regarding the counteraction of the FCRs and
he load shedding (including load curtailment and under-frequency
oad shedding) and their impacts on the cascading outages. In tra-
itional approaches, regardless cascading outages, it is considered
hat the higher amount of the FCRs leads to the higher system secu-
ity. Whereas, on one hand, a smaller amount of the FCRs may
ause successive actions of under-frequency load shedding which
ncrease the number of small blackouts. On the other hand, an
xcessive amount of the FCRs avoids the operation of the under-
requency load shedding and decreases the probability of small
lackouts. However, it can increase the probability of line overloads
hat produces a triggering of cascading outages and consequent
arge blackouts. One may  state that, within the context of the real
peration of a given power system, the operator should ensure,
or the different time frames, the transferability of FCRs avoiding
ransmission lines overloading. However, in the provision of control
ctions of interconnected power systems operated by several oper-
tors with limited coordination, it is practically impossible to take
nto account all possible contingency scenarios N − k (k = 1, . . .,  N)
ogether with cascading failures.
In order to study the aforementioned phenomena, a blackout
isk analysis method based on Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) is
roposed. It takes into account different aspects such as the effects
f cascading outages and the response of generating units/loads
o the power imbalance. As a result, appropriate modeling of the
ast and slow progress events, and the corresponding response of
ontrollers, are necessary to study the blackout dynamics in power
ystems [10].
In blackout dynamics, cascading outages of overloaded compo-
ents can progress either quickly or slowly. Fast progress events,Fig. 1. Fast dynamics and external/internal forces.
initiated by large outages, involve different types of instability
phenomena in time scales of seconds to several tens of seconds.
Slow progress events are, typically, line tripping due to overloading
in minutes time scales [11].
Concerning what FCRs entail, across different systems there are
many different terms, deﬁnitions, and rules [12]. In this paper, the
frequency reserve services are classiﬁed into automatically and
manually activated FCRs given by PgA and PgM, respectively. Accord-
ing to the hierarchical FCR classiﬁcation (with primary, secondary
and tertiary), the automatic FCR can be considered, in general, as
primary and part of the secondary whereas the manual FCR is com-
posed of the remaining part of the secondary and the tertiary. After
a contingency occurrence, it is assumed that the automatic FCRs
are decentrally activated in proportion to the frequency deviation
to restore the equilibrium between generation and consumption in
the operating time frame. Then, cascading outages progress in the
system according to the re-established balance and the new power
ﬂows resulting from the activation of reserves. After a certain time,
the system operator optimally deploys the automatic and manual
FCRs to avoid the overloading and minimize the load curtailment in
a centralized manner. Other control means, such as modiﬁcation of
line topology or adjustment of phase shifters, could also be used by
the system operator. However they have been disregarded in the
development of this paper for the sake of simplicity. In this respect,
further investigations are needed.
In view of the above, the proposed model aims to effectively
show the interaction between FCRs and load shedding as opposing
forces in the short-term dynamics. The set points of the controllers
designed beforehand, as external driving forces, are assumed to be
ﬁxed during fast dynamics. The general structure of this model is
shown in Fig. 1.
From the practical point of view, the ENTSOE allows exchange,
sharing and distribution of reserves between synchronous areas
so that the activation of these reserves does not jeopardize the
system security [13]. A survey study has been published in [6]
concerning the assessment of inter-area FCR by means of different
approaches that accounts for the system security. However, none
of these approaches captures the dynamics of the cascading events
and blackouts. Consequently the risk of large blackouts is not taken
into consideration effectively.
3. Blackout risk assessment method
This section describes a statistical method which aims to numer-
ically evaluate the risk of cascading blackouts regarding the FCRs.
The method considers the following elements: (a) the effects of
cascading outages due to overloads and hidden failure of protec-
tion systems, (b) the response of the FCRs of the generating units
and the self-regulation of loads to power imbalance (i.e. frequency
deviation) in each step of cascading outages. The preliminary ver-
sion of this method is presented in previous works published by the
1 wer Sy
a
h
c
p
a
c
S
b
a
t
T
c
G
q
i
p
a
t
t
t
o
b
s
a
i
p
s
a
o
f
t
f
b
d
a
t
p
m
t
p
s
f
f
s
d
i
t
(
F
i
s
e

w
q
M
d
e
t
m46 O. Alizadeh Mousavi et al. / Electric Po
uthors in [10,14]. In comparison with these references, the method
ere presented for the blackout risk assessment is enriched by
onsidering several mechanisms, such as random loading pattern,
ossibility of generating unit shut down in case of over-frequency
nd model of operators’ corrective actions after several steps of
ascading outages, as explained with more details at the end of
ection 3. Beside, in contrary to Refs. [10,14], the classiﬁcation
etween the automatic and manual FCRs is taken into consider-
tion. It must be noted that this model represents only some of
he main important mechanisms associated to blackout dynamics.
he other concomitant mechanisms, such as voltage excursions and
ollapse and transient instability, are not taken into consideration.
enerally, these mechanisms do not impose high impact on the fre-
uency control reserve and the frequency control procedure. That
s due to the commonly acceptable assumptions to decouple the
ower systems analyses into (i) transient and steady state studies
nd (ii) voltage and frequency studies [15].
For the blackout risk assessment purpose, the MCS is applied
o provide contingency scenarios including both generation and
ransmission outages. The system states are derived by sampling
he state of each component based on its own availability. One
f the merits of the MCS  method is that it has the ability to look
eyond the probable contingencies, taking into account rare, but
igniﬁcant, events. Moreover, the dagger sampling is used as a vari-
nce reduction technique to simulate the rare event cases and to
mprove the performance of the MCS  [16]. This method is appro-
riate for two state variables and small probability events. In this
ampling method, for each component with failure probability p,
 single failure is randomly selected within each 1/p trials. Hence,
nly one random number determines the state of the component
or 1/p trials [17]. Moreover, a random variation in the loading pat-
ern is considered while the total load is kept constant. The reason
or this is that the distribution of loads changes during the day and
etween days and cascading blackouts could start at different ran-
om loading patterns. The random loading pattern is modeled with
 normal distribution whereas the mean is equal to the amounts of
he loads. A 5% of the variance is also considered in the loading
attern distribution.
The contingency scenarios construct the system states and
odel the initial event. In the simulation procedure, after the ini-
ial event or after each step of cascading outages, there may  be a
ower imbalance and, consequently, a frequency deviation in the
ystem. It is assumed that the frequency deviation spreads uni-
ormly in the system and all the generators with their automatic
requency control respond to this power imbalance. A distributed
lack bus model is employed in such a way that all of the remaining
ispatched generating units share the power imbalance accord-
ng to their droop frequency-control characteristics with respect
o their capacity limit (P¯g = Pg0 + PgA) where Pg0 (P¯g) is the initial
maximum) power output of generators and PgA is the automatic
CR of generators. The self-regulation effect of loads is also taken
nto account. So, the frequency deviation (f) of the system in each
tep of cascading outages is calculated according to the following
quation [15]:
f  = −P∑
˝D
Dd +
∑
˝G
1/Rg
(1)
here P  is the power imbalance in MW, Dd and Rg are the fre-
uency characteristics of dth load and gth generator (droop) in
W/Hz and Hz/MW, respectively. ˝D and ˝G indicate the set of
emands and generators, respectively.
It is assumed that, if the frequency deviation in the system
xceeds or drops 5% of the nominal frequency, all the generators in
his area trip and the system collapses [10]. Moreover, if the total
inimum output of generators (
∑
Pming ) is higher than the totalstems Research 107 (2014) 144– 152
amount of load (
∑
Pd), the system is not any more controllable and
it collapses.
Whenever the frequency deviation is in the allowed range, but
the available capacities of the synchronized generating units are
unable to satisfy the load, a frequency load shedding scheme uni-
formly disconnects the amount of the load to reach a new power
balance. In the case of overfrequency in the allowed range, the
generating units decrease their surplus output according to their
frequency-control characteristics while accounting for their output
lower bounds. After the generation and load balance is restored, a
linearized load ﬂow (DCLF) is applied to calculate the power ﬂow
and the transmission loading in each step of the cascading outages.
The outage of overloaded lines is one of the most important
mechanisms in the power system blackouts. Moreover, the protec-
tion system has an undetected defect that remains dormant until an
abnormal operating condition is reached. This state is often referred
to as ‘hidden failure’. In order to consider the effect of hidden fail-
ure in cascading outages, it is assumed that each transmission line
has a different ﬂow-dependent probability of incorrect trip. This
characteristic is modeled as an increasing function of the line ﬂow
which is seen by the line protective relay [4]. As shown in Fig. 2, the
probability of failure is small and equal to 0.01 for line ﬂow lower
than the line limit. This probability increases in proportion to the
line ﬂow between 1 and 1.4 times of the line limit. The lines that
loaded more than 1.4 times of the line limit (overloaded lines) trips.
It is worth to mention that in this model, in a given step of the cas-
cading outages, the hidden failures can occur if none of the lines is
loaded more than 1.4 times the capacity limit. Also, the lines which
are connected to the last tripped lines are exposed to the hidden
failure of protection system according to the obtained probability
from Fig. 2.
As above-mentioned, after each step of cascading outage, power
generation and consumption balance would be restored mainly
through the generators automatic frequency response. These gen-
erating units reach their new operating points typically in tens of
seconds. Therefore, the operator has the opportunity to implement
some remedial (corrective) actions and minimize the amount of
lost load, after several steps of cascading outages. The model of
operators’ response to contingencies is considered as a linearized
optimal power ﬂow (DC OPF) [10]. This control decision is calcu-
lated centrally for the interconnected system. Five steps of cascades
are allowed before the operator intervention using DC OPF, which
is an appropriate delay to model this action according to [18]. The
aim of the DC OPF is the minimization of the lost load through
re-dispatching the generating units and shedding some loads. It
is assumed that in this step the operator can utilize both auto-
matic and manual FCRs (P¯g = Pg0 + PgA + PgM ). Here, the generating
unit shut down is also considered as a control action, whenever
the total load (
∑
Pd) is less than the minimum generation output
(
∑
Pming ).
In each step of the cascading outages, if the system is divided
into multiple segments, the simulation would be separately per-
formed for each segment. It is assumed that each segment
continues its operation under this condition considering its own
constraints.
For a given scenario s, the ﬂowchart and models of the proposed
blackout risk assessment procedure are given in Fig. 2. The step-
by-step procedure to simulate the system for the sth scenario is as
follows.
(1) Check the system split and perform the simulation for each
segment.
(2) Calculate the frequency deviation due to contingency according
to the generators automatic frequency control response and the
load frequency characteristics in Eq. (1).
O. Alizadeh Mousavi et al. / Electric Power Systems Research 107 (2014) 144– 152 147
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3) According to the computed frequency deviation, demand,
upper and lower limits of generators (Pg and Pg), if the fre-
quency deviation is higher than the frequency protection of the
generating units ( ) or the system is not controllable ( ), the
system collapses; otherwise ( ) restore the generation
and load balance and use a DCLF to ﬁnd the transmission ﬂows.
4) If there is any overloading in the transmission system, trip the
overloaded elements and then go to step (6); otherwise check
the hidden failure of the protection system.
5) If there is any outage due to hidden failure go to step (6); oth-
erwise there is not any cascading effect in this scenario and go
to step (7).
6) Check if the operator can intervene and perform remedial (cor-
rective) action; otherwise go to step (1). It is considered that the
operator would have time to perform the remedial actions after
ﬁve steps of cascading outages. This corrective action is a DC OPF
for the minimization of lost load (min  PC ) concerning the con-
straints of generators Pg ≤ Pg ≤ P¯g) and transmission elements
(Pl ≤ P¯l).
7) Save the number of transmission line outage and the amount
of lost load.
After simulating each scenario, the obtained amount of lost loads
nd the number of transmission component outages are used to
valuate the risk of blackout. For this purpose, the complemen-
ary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of continuous random
ariables (lost load) is calculated by simply ranking the data and
hen scaling the ranked data. Also, the probability distribution func-
ion (PDF) of discrete random variables (number of transmission
omponent outages) is calculated simply by assigning a probability
o each possible value such that the total probability for all random
ariables is equal to 1. In general, for the cumulative probability
ssociated with a particular quantity (e.g. lost load), a sufﬁcient
umber of the MCS  samples should be calculated to ensure a spe-
iﬁc level of accuracy (±ı) associated with a conﬁdence level ().
he accuracy level is used as the stopping criteria for the MCS.
or an output distribution, the regions closer to small size quan-
ities will reach higher accuracy levels relatively faster compared
o regions toward the heavy tail. The proposed method ensures the
equired level of accuracy associated with a value xm by determin-
ng what fraction of the samples fell at or above xm. If so far we
ave had n samples of MCS  and m have fallen at or above xm, the
umulative percentile (pm) can be estimated as pm = m/n. Then, by
sing Eq. (2) and monitoring m and n we can determine whether
he required level of accuracy is obtained [16]. Here, the variablemulation procedure for a given scenario s.
xm could be considered for the lost load as well as the number of
outages.
ı = z ·
√
pm · (1 − pm)
n
(2)
where z is 1.96, 2.56 and 3.29 for 95%, 99% and 99.9% of the conﬁ-
dence level, respectively. Here, all the simulations come with 99%
of the conﬁdence level. In order to provide the stopping criteria for
the MCS  using Eq. (2), the value xm should be deﬁned for any out-
put quantity. Since in this paper we  derive the CCDF of the lost load
and the PDF of the outages number, two  different values xc and xp
are speciﬁed. In order to tune the process, xc and xp have been cho-
sen according to a sensitivity analysis that accounts for the ratio
of the lost load to the total load and the ratio of the number of
outages to the total number of lines, respectively. With regard to
xc and xp, the distributions could be effectively demonstrated by
obtaining an accuracy levels (ı) lower than 0.001 [14]. This value is
selected by qualitatively analyzing the smoothness of distributions
particularly in their tail behaviors. At the end of the MCS  trials, the
expected load not supplied (ELNS) is calculated as follows [17].
ELNS =
∑
nP
(n)
C
n
(3)
where P(n)C is the lost load in nth trial of the MCS. It should be noted
that the coefﬁcient of variance (c) of an expected value (e.g. ELNS)
can be obtained according to
c =
√
var (x)
E (x)
(4)
where var(·) and E(·) are the variance and the expected value of
the random variable x, respectively. When the MCS  is employed to
estimate an expected or a mean value, c can be used as the stop-
ping criteria [10]. Generally, fewer of the MCS trials are required to
estimate an expected value (with a certain coefﬁcient of variance)
rather than a distribution function (with a certain accuracy level).
The reason is that the stability of the expected values is not affected
by the number of MCS  trials as much as the smoothness of the tail
behavior in the probability distributions.
4. Simulations and discussions
The aforementioned dynamics of blackouts in the FCRs is inves-
tigated with reference to the IEEE 118 bus system. As shown in
Fig. 3, such a system is considered as an interconnected one with
three main areas. The detailed data of generation, load, and trans-
mission system are given in [19]. The unavailability of transmission
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The amount of generation and the maximum available reserveFig. 3. IEEE 118 bus system with three areas.
ines (Ul) and generation units (Ug) are assumed equal to 0.01. The
esponse of generator (rg) and loads (dn) to the frequency devia-
ion are considered equal to 0.05 and 1.00, respectively. Note that
g and dn are in per-unit and they are converted to Rg and Dn for
ach generator and load by using Eq. (1).
The proposed blackout risk analysis method is applied for each
rea separately as well as for the interconnected system. Different
mounts of the automatic reserve are speciﬁed for each one of the
our study cases while the manual reserve is retained ﬁxed. Then,
he risks of blackout in each area and in the interconnected system
re compared using the distribution of the lost load and the number
f transmission component outages as the measures of the blackout
ize. For this purpose, the CCDF of the lost load data and the PDF
Fig. 5. PDF of number of trFig. 4. CCDF of lost load for interconnected system for RgA = 25% with its conﬁdence
interval.
of the number of transmission outages are calculated. The CCDF
of the lost load and the PDF of the outage numbers are plotted in
the log-log and log-linear axes, respectively, to effectively illustrate
the distributions characteristics. For the convenience of compar-
ing different systems, the amount of disconnected load divided by
the total load, as a normalized blackout indicator, is used in this
study.(Pmaxg − Pg0) for each area is given in Table 1. In reality, differ-
ent deterministic and probabilistic approaches can be used for the
provision of the FCRs with respect to the security and economy
ansmission outages.
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Table 1
Generation and reserve of each area.
Generation (MW)  Maximum available reserve (MW)
Area A 1076.00 500.00
Area B 1866.53 1024.20
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c
interconnected system the provision of FCRs should receive more
consideration.Area C 1547.84 700.00
riterion. At the end, the total amount of FCRs could be repre-
ented as a percentage of the total capacity of generators. Moreover,
t is assumed that the FCRs are evenly distributed based on the
et generation and consumption and the remaining capacity of
ach generator. This simplifying assumption is somewhat conser-
ative regarding the aim of this analysis because a given generator
esponse to a frequency deviation will be provided, in reality, by
ifferent generators connected to the system. It reduces the risk
f further overloads comparing to the case when a certain limited
umber of generators respond to the frequency deviation. Here, the
imulations are performed for the four study cases with different
mounts of automatic FCR (which are 5%, 15% and 25%) and with
he same value of the manual FCR (which is 15%). Since the manual
eserve remains unchanged, from now whenever the term reserve
s used, it refers to the automatic reserve.
It should be noted that, for each area, the neighboring ones
eyond the interconnections, are modeled by a simple active power
njection. In this way, each interconnection line is modeled by a
onsumption or generation.ransmission outages.
As mentioned earlier, the obtained distributions from the MCS
always come with a conﬁdence interval which ensures the spec-
iﬁed accuracy level. As an example, in the interconnected system
case study with RgA = 25%, for the corresponding CCDF of the lost
load, the conﬁdence interval associated with the accuracy level is
shown in Fig. 4. Another interesting point of the obtained results
is that the maximum blackout size is 0.76 of the total load. This
value is consistent with the reality, because no blackout has been
recorded in which all the interconnected system demands have
been interrupted. Additionally, since this work studies the short-
term dynamics of a power system with a ﬁxed topology, it is
expected to have an approximated power law region that covers
a speciﬁc range of values. This region is much more limited in the
distributions of each area because the system size is not sufﬁciently
large.
The obtained results of the PDF of the number of outages for Area
A, B, C and the interconnected system are given in Fig. 5a–d, respec-
tively. These ﬁgures effectively demonstrate that the probabilities
of small and large number of outages are dependent. Generally, as
the amount of reserves increases, the probability of a higher num-
ber of outages increases. This behavior is more explicit in Area
B in comparison with the other ones. The reason is the higher
amount of the reserve in Area B. However, the interconnection of
the areas intensiﬁes this behavior as depicted in Fig. 5d. Thus, in theFurthermore, the different regions in the CCDFs of the number
of outages for different amounts of reserves concerning areas A, B, C
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Table 3
Probability of scenario with lost load for all study cases for various amounts of
reserve.
PgA (%) Area A Area B Area C Interconnected system
5 0.1299 0.1227 0.1056 0.2291Fig. 7. CC
nd the interconnected system, are presented in Fig. 6a–d, respec-
ively. They indicate two  regions for the small and large number
f outages. The distribution curve with the lower values of reserve
orresponds to the lower probability of a speciﬁed blackout size.
ccording to Fig. 6, the increase of the reserve starting from 5%
ecreases (resp. increases) the probability of small (resp. large)
umber of outages. It means that the number of events with small
resp. large) number of outages decreases (resp. increases). This
ehavior becomes more signiﬁcant in the interconnected system
s illustrated in Fig. 5d. These results conﬁrm the obtained results
rom the PDF of the number of outages.
The expected number of outages (ENO) is calculated analogous
o Eq. (3) and the result for different study cases. Then, an unbiased
xpected number of outage (UENO) is deﬁned as the ratio of the
NO to the total number of transmission lines in each study case.
he value of UENO for every study case is given in Table 2. This
able effectively demonstrates the increase of the UENO with the
ncrease of the reserve. Also, for each amount of reserve, the value of
ENO is higher in the interconnected system which demonstrates
 higher level of risk. The CCDF of the lost load data for Area A, B, C
nd the interconnected system are given in Fig. 7a–d, respectively.
able 2
nbiased expected number of outages for all study cases for various amounts of
eserve.
PgA (%) Area A Area B Area C Interconnected system
5 0.0129 0.0113 0.0114 0.0168
15  0.0135 0.0115 0.0118 0.0181
25  0.0147 0.0118 0.0121 0.018415  0.1196 0.1217 0.0784 0.1619
25  0.1113 0.1103 0.0681 0.1494
The CCDF of the lost load starts at different values. This value shows
the total number of scenarios with lost load per total number of
scenarios (probability of scenarios with lost load). For instance in
Fig. 7d, the probability of scenarios with lost load considering the
reserve 5%, 15% and 25% are 0.2291, 0.1619 and 0.1494, respec-
tively. These values for different cases are given in Table 3. In all the
study cases, as illustrated in Fig. 7 and in Table 3, the higher amount
of the reserve decreases the number of scenarios with lost load. It
means that the higher reserve decreases the number of small black-
outs. This speciﬁc aspect has been previously shown by the fact that
higher a reserve increases the number of large blackouts.
In addition to studying the distributions of the blackout size, the
expected measures (e.g. ELNS) could also be investigated. Hence,
the ELNS for each case obtained from Eq. (3) is given in Table 4. The
Table 4
ELNS in every area and interconnected system for various amounts of reserves.
PgA (%) Area A Area B Area C Interconnected system
5 0.2550 0.2100 0.1322 0.8859
15  0.2488 0.1719 0.0894 0.7048
25  0.2600 0.1384 0.0637 0.6730
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esults show that the ELNS decreases by the increase of the reserve
n all the cases as consistent to traditional ﬁndings. The expected
alues like ELNS cannot effectively reveal the impact of large black-
uts since these events occur with small probabilities. As a matter
f fact, this measure cannot show the impact of the aforementioned
ascading dynamics with respect to the FCR. In order to evaluate the
verall risk for blackouts of all possible scales, the unserved energy
nd its frequency should be known. The unserved energy can be
erived as the product of the lost load and the duration of the black-
ut to obtain the direct cost. On one hand, the cost of small power
nterruptions, which are more frequent, have a strong impact on the
otal cost of power outages. On the other hand, if the costs of the
arge blackouts are considered, the risk of the large blackouts may
xceed the risk of more frequent small blackouts [3]. Value at risk
VaR) and conditional value at risk (CVaR) are introduced to eval-
ate the blackout risk quantitatively with more focus on the large
cale blackouts [20]. Non-linear indications are utilized to deﬁne a
ost function in [3]. The discussions on the ELNS and the blackout
ost are presented as general remarks and further details on these
ssues are out of the scope of this paper.
According to the results and discussions above, a system dynam-
cs model for the FCRs considering the cascading outages is
epresented in Fig. 8a. As a complement, the effect of different
orces on the PDF of the blackout size is given in Fig. 8b. As a
esult, the control of the system with such a sophisticated dynamic
hould be enhanced with sophisticated control or optimization
pproaches, speciﬁcally in the interconnected systems.
. Discussions for further investigations
The effects of different policies of FCRs on the cascading outage,
nd the consequent risk of small and large blackouts, have been
tudied in this paper. As a result, a tradeoff should be assessed
etween large and small blackout frequency with respect to the
alue of FCRs, speciﬁcally in interconnected power systems. This
ew solution might affect both economical and reserve dispatch-
ng that would impose additional cost to the system operation. It
hould be noted that this paper faces the modeling, simulation and
nalysis of complex power grids; however, there are mathematical
esearch challenges for the optimization of complex systems [21].Alternatively, the qualitative indices (QI) method presented in
22] can also be proposed to manage the difﬁculties through a
ultimodal approach by introducing a threshold. As far as the QI
ndicates the normal condition, the current hierarchical control is and (b) the effect of different forces on PDF of blackout size measure.
effective. Whenever the QI indicates the system is departed from
the normal condition, it informs the primary controllers whose
logic has been changed to effectively act as conditions change. In
this case, the resources should be adjusted to keep the intercon-
nections operation as close as possible to the normal condition
by means of hierarchical control, while critical desynchronization
with the system islanding and load shedding could also be included.
This approach is an online control that acts as a corrective action
and it does not impose additional constraints on energy and reserve
provision markets. This method could be implemented in a fully
decentralized way  or in the security control centers like Coreso
(coordination of electricity system operators). However, the main
issues are the deﬁnition of the QI and the value of the threshold to
characterize the “extreme outlier events”.
Furthermore, the fast power electronic controllers of FACTS
and HVDC devices, installed on the interconnections, could be
employed to control the ﬂows between utilities during emergen-
cies. They could act like ﬁrewalls against the spread of the cascading
outages.
6. Conclusions
Based on the work presented by the authors in [10,14], this
manuscript proposes an improved method to estimate the black-
out risk taking into account the classiﬁcation of the automatic and
manual FCRs, the random loading pattern, the possibility of gener-
ating unit shut down in case of over-frequency, and the model of
operators’ corrective actions after several steps of cascading out-
ages.
The paper has investigated the dependency of the probability of
different blackouts scales with respect to the FCRs. Within the con-
text of the blackouts scales assessment, the ﬁrst aim has referred
to investigating the counter-intuitive effect of the under-frequency
load shedding and the FCR in the short-term dynamics. Secondly, it
is shown that this issue becomes more signiﬁcant in interconnected
power systems. Moreover, it is illustrated that the decrease of the
amount of reserve increases the number of under-frequency load
shedding and consequently increases the number of small black-
outs. As a counter effect, the higher amounts of reserve increase the
probability of overloading and cascading outages and consequently
large blackouts.
The main conclusion of the paper is that this speciﬁc behavior
should be considered in the reserve assessment of interconnected
systems to prevent the risk of large blackouts. In particular,
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dditional constraints should be taken into account in the operation
f interconnected power systems in order to control the participa-
ion of each area in the reserve provision.
As the last remark, this paper only considers the provided
eserve of the generators and the self-regulating effect of the loads;
owever, the required reserves could also be provided from the
emand side. The fast demand side reserves contribute by cur-
ailing a portion of the load. It effectively decreases the level of
he illustrated complications, since it does not inject additional
ower into the grid after a disturbance. As a result, the proba-
ility of cascading outages and eventually large blackouts could
ecrease.
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